

ACIS-1267/85

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Overview of Key Arms Control Issues for DCI

WHAT TO AVOID:

-- Interim Restraint:

sidestep substance . . . issue under review now . . . will have to go to President . . . very complex . . . very important . . . to US, to Allies, and to USSR . . .

-- Current Compliance Talks:

sidestep . . . US bound by confidentiality rule in SCC . . . (FYI: Soviets have complained about public statements of US officials) . . .

-- Intelligence Details:

sidestep . . . of all US officials who should not discuss details of intelligence work, DCI is #1 . . .

WHAT TO ENGAGE:

-- Round II of Nuclear and Space Arms Talks:

begins today (30 May) . . . US in Geneva for constructive work . . . negotiators have flexibility . . . Soviet attitude and rate of progress remain to be seen . . . will depend on US-USSR relationship and Gorbachev's own interests . . .

-- Violations:

A central problem in arms control today . . . President's report sets out US positions . . . other issues under discussion with USSR now . . . Soviets not particularly forthcoming overall . . . litmus test for the future . . . US responses are mandatory, substantively and politically.

-- Verification:

a pacing element in arms control policy more than ever, especially with extant violations . . . US never has relied on "trust" . . . US intelligence is the core behind verification . . . both sides use "national technical means". more modern weapons (e.g., mobile ICBMs) make verification harder . . . some provisions in future may require cooperative measure, such as onsite inspection and monitoring . . . onsite monitoring agreed with USSR in mid-70s for nuclear testing accords and earlier too . . .

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